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Sammendrag 
Mange offentlige prosjekter finansieres med skatter som har negative virkninger på økonomiens 
effektivitet mht. ressursbruk. Kostnadene av slike negative virkninger implementeres i nytte-
kostnadsanalyser ved at kostnadene multipliseres med en faktor, MCF. Norge har benyttet en MCF lik 
1.2 de senere årene.  
 
Flere nyere studier viser at tilbudet av kollektive goder bør bestemmes av nytte-kostnadsanalyser uten 
korreksjoner for negative virkinger av skatter, dvs. at MCF er lik 1. Definisjonen på MCF som 
benyttes i flere av disse studiene forutsetter imidlertid at betalingsviljen for kollektive goder i nytte-
kostnadsanalyser vektes med en faktor som korrigerer for fordelingseffektene av kollektive goder. En 
slik vekting inngår imidlertid ikke i anvendte nytte-kostnadsanalyser. Forskningsbidraget i denne 
artikkelen er å beregne et MCF-mål som er tilpasset anvendte nytte-kostnadsanalyser. Utgangspunktet 
for beregningen er at kollektive goder er fordelingsnøytrale. Faktoren som korrigerer for 
fordelingseffektene av kollektive goder er derfor fjernet. Beregningen av MCF tar imidlertid hensyn til 
at skattene tilpasses optimalt, dvs. slik at velferden i samfunnet maksimeres. MCF beregnes også i 
tilfellet der skatteinntektene er underoptimale.  
 
Studien finner at MCF bør settes slik at velferdsgevinsten av investeringer i kollektive goder på 
marginen er lik alternativkostnaden av penger i offentlig sektor. Denne alternativkostnaden er lik 
velferdsgevinsten av sosiale overføringer. Studien finner at MCF har en størrelsesorden rundt hhv. 
1.04 og 1.15 i optimale løsninger for Norge med uniforme overføringer, gitt at 
arbeidstilbudselastisiteten er lik hhv. 0.1 og 0.2. Studien finner at MCF bør settes marginalt høyere når 
det antas at overføringer er forbeholdt svakerestilte grupper i samfunnet. Studien finner i tillegg at 
MCF bør settes enda høyere når inntektsskatten settes lavere enn den optimale løsningen. Forklaringen 
er at lavere skatteinntekter øker velferdsgevinsten av omfordeling. En økning i MCF forhindrer at 
kollektive goder fortrenger omfordeling som gir en høyere velferdsgevinst. Disse resultatene gir 
samlet sett støtte for en videreføring av dagens praksis med en MCF lik 1.2. Forenklede forutsetninger 
innebærer at de numeriske resultatene bør tolkes som illustrasjoner. 
4 
1. Introduction 
Many public projects are financed with tax revenue from distorting taxes. The cost of such distortions 
is incorporated into cost-benefit analyses of public projects by multiplying costs with a factor labeled 
the Marginal Cost of Public Funds (MCF). Recent studies however argue that the MCF equals one 
within optimized tax systems, and that the Samuelson rule should determine the supply of public 
goods, see Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979), Boadway and Keen (1993), Kaplow (1996), Sandmo 
(1998), Christiansen (1981), Christiansen (2007), Jacobs (2018) and Stiglitz (2018). The present study 
challenges the arguments which lead to these results. It is argued that these results eighter rely on 
restrictive assumptions or a definition of MCF which is inconsistent with applied cost-benefit tests. 
The definitions of MCF employed require a modification of the Samuelson rule where the willingness 
to pay for public goods is adjusted with distributional characteristics of public goods, see Sandmo 
(1998) and Jacobs (2018). Such adjustments are excluded from applied cost-benefit tests, however. 
The contribution of the present study is to derive a measure of MCF which is relevant in such an 
applied cost-benefit analyses. The analytical expressions are supplemented with numerical 
illustrations.    
 
The present study also challenges the view that the MCF equals one within optimized tax systems. The 
study shows that the MCF is determined by the opportunity cost of public funds, i.e. so that the 
welfare gain of spending additional public funds on public goods provision equals the welfare gain of 
spending additional public funds on social security transfers. The study shows that the MCF designed 
for applied cost-benefit studies exceeds one in the case of optimized linear income taxation, and in the 
case of optimized non-negative categorical social security transfers. Hence, the optimal supply of 
public goods will be lower than the supply implied by the Samuelson rule. Income taxation below 
optimum requires an even higher MCF to prevent that public goods provision crowds out social 
security transfers with a higher marginal welfare gain.  
 
The studies referred to above, in which the original Samuelson rule holds, rely on quite restrictive 
assumptions. The pioneering contribution of Christiansen (1981) shows that the original Samuelson 
rule holds within optimized non-linear tax systems when individuals have identical preferences that 
are weakly separable in labor and the bundle of public and private goods. Boadway and Keen (1993) 
confirm and generalize Christiansens result. They show that the original Samuelson rule should 
determine the level of public goods when the marginal rate of substitution between private and public 
goods are equalized among high- and low productive individuals. This condition is violated in the 
plausible case where individuals have equal additive preferences for public goods, and where poor 
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individuals have higher marginal utility of private consumer goods. The present study contributes by 
quantifying the MCF within such plausible cases.   
 
Definitions of MCF in the literature imply a modification of the original Samuelson rule, see excellent 
contributions by Sandmo (1998), Jacobs (2018), and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2001). The modification 
consists of incorporating distributional characteristics of public goods into the benefit-side of the rule. 
Sandmo (1998) shows that the most frequently used definition of MCF, i.e. the ratio between the 
marginal value of money in the public sector and the average marginal value of money in the private 
sector, is less than one when leisure is a normal good and taxation distorts the supply of labor. 
Uniform transfers expand the distortion in the supply of labor, and hence, drives MCF below one in 
this case. A MCF below one raises the optimal supply of public goods. This result is consistent with 
Wilson (1991), who shows that the optimal level of public goods provision with optimized linear 
taxation exceeds the first-best level obtained by the original Samuelson rule. This optimized level is 
unchanged when sub-optimal consumer tax rates are implemented.   
 
Jacobs (2018) shows that a Diamond based definition of MCF, which equals the marginal value of 
public funds divided by the average of the social marginal value of private income, equals one within 
optimized linear and non-linear tax systems with uniform transfers. The modification of the original 
Samuelson rule described above is also present with this definition. The MCF equals one, he argues, 
because it is sub-optimal to distort public goods provision when the welfare cost of raising tax revenue 
equals the welfare gain of redistributing public funds. Fixed sub-optimal transfers implies that the 
government resorts to distortionary taxation as a strategy to finance public goods provision. Jacobs 
(2018) shows that the MCF is below one in this case when the income tax is below the optimal level. 
The present study contributes by calculating MCF designed for applied cost-benefit tests, i.e. where 
distributional characteristics of public goods are excluded from cost-benefit tests. Distributional 
characteristics of public goods is excluded by assuming equal additive preferences for public goods.  
 
The present study explores scenarios where linear taxation is optimized. It also studies the case of sub-
optimal income tax rates, since taxes are unpopular with voters and politicians. The study shows that 
the most frequently used definition of MCF equals one in scenarios with both optimal and sub-optimal 
taxation. This definition of MCF equals one because the value of money in the public sector is 
determined by the value of uniform social transfers. Such uniform transfers do not distort the supply of 
labor when quasilinear utility is assumed. Such a utility function seems to be consistent with empirical 
studies of labor supply, showing negligible income elasticities, see Thoresen and Vattø (2015), 
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Dagsvik et al. (2018) and Blau and Kahn (2007). These assumptions also imply that public goods 
provision does not magnify labor supply distortions. The value of money in the public sector therefore 
equals the average marginal value of money in the private sector in scenarios with both optimal and 
sub-optimal income taxation. Hence, the study elaborates on the finding in Jacobs (2018) by 
demonstrating that the most frequently used MCF measure equals one even though the proportional 
income tax rate is sub-optimal. These results deviate from those in Sandmo (1998) and Wilson (1991) 
because transfers do not distort the supply of labor. 
 
The MCF measure relevant for applied cost-benefit tests equals the welfare maximizing adjustment in 
resource costs within the original Samuelson rule. A numerical illustration shows that this MCF 
measure approximately equals 1.04 and 1.16-1.25 within optimized solutions with linear income 
taxation and uniform transfers when the uncompensated labor supply elasticity equals 0.1 and 0.2, 
respectively. Hence, the optimal supply of public goods is below the supply obtained by the 
Samuelson rule. The MCF measure is even higher when the income tax rate is fixed below optimum. 
The opportunity cost of public funds is determined by the value of the alternative use of public funds 
in this case, see Massiani and Picco (2013). The explanation is that the opportunity cost of public 
goods provision, i.e. the welfare gain of social security transfers, increases as the tax is reduced below 
optimum. The MCF is increased to prevent that public goods provision crowd out social security 
transfers with a higher marginal welfare gain.  
 
Most previous studies analyze MCF within models where uniform transfers are given to all 
individuals. However, real world social security transfers are typically given to specific groups of poor 
individuals, with a marginal utility of income above average. This scenario emerges in optimized 
solutions when it is assumed that categorical transfers are non-negative, see Slack (2015)1. The present 
study contributes by showing that the most frequently used definition of MCF is larger than one when 
non-negative categorical transfers are offered to a poor group with a marginal utility of income above 
average. The MCF designed for applied cost-benefit tests also exceeds one in cases with non-negative 
categorical transfers. These results hold in scenarios with extensive margin labor choices, see Bjertnæs 
(2018). The MCF exceeds one because the opportunity cost of public funds, the welfare gain of 
categorical transfers, exceeds the average value of money in the private sector. The MCF exceeds one 
even though the cost of raising tax revenue equals the welfare gain of redistributing public funds. 
Hence, this result contradicts the explanation of why the MCF equals one in Jacobs (2018). Numerical 
                                                     
1 Positive lump-sum taxes are excluded in most countries. The Thatcher-government imposed lump-sum poll taxes in 1990 in 
England. It created social turmoil and riots in several cities before it was abandoned later that year.  
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sensitivity tests show that the MCF equals 1.05-1.07 and 1.11-1.16 in scenarios with non-negative 
categorical transfers to specific groups when the uncompensated labor supply elasticity equals 0.1 and 
0.2, respectively. These results hold when the proportional income tax is replaced with a uniform tax 
on consumption, and when quasilinear preferences are replaced with Stone-Gary preferences. The 
MCF is increased when the income tax rate is reduced below optimum within these scenarios.    
 
Section 2 present MCF-measures. Section 3 present the model framework and analytical results. 
Section 4 present numerical illustrations, and section 5 concludes.    
2. MCF measures employed  
The most frequently used approach is to define the MCF as the marginal value of money in the public 
sector divided by the (average) marginal value of money in the private sector, see e.g. Atkinson and 
Stern (1974) and Sandmo (1998). Jacobs (2018), on the other hand, employs a Diamond-based 
definition of MCF. The Diamond-based definition of MCF is identical with the definition in Sandmo 
(1998) when the supply of labor is unaffected by transfers. The definition of MCF in Sandmo (1998) is 







The 𝑀𝐶𝐹1 is defined as the shadow value of public funds, 𝜇, divided by the average marginal utility of 
income, ?̄?. The ?̄?-parameter is necessary in the definition to convert the welfare effect of public funds 
into units of income/ consumption goods. Hence, the MCF is sometimes interpreted as the 
governments marginal rate of substitution between money in the public and the private sector.   
 
Different definitions of MCF produce different estimates of MCF. The academic discussion of MCF is 
consequently hampered as economists disagree on which definition that should be employed. Jacobs 
(2018) argue that the most regularly used definition has some undesirable properties. Holtsmark 
(2019) however argue that the Diamond-based definition has some undesirable properties2. The 
present study develops a new approach designed to avoids these problems. The new approach consists 
                                                     
2 Valseth et al. (2019) adopts a new definition where the MCF equals the welfare cost of raising tax revenue divided by the 
welfare cost of increasing individualized lump-sum taxes so that the loss of utility is equalized among all individuals. This 
definition should however not be interpreted as the governments marginal rate of substitution between money in the public 
and the private sector.       
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of calculating the welfare maximizing adjustment in resource costs within the original Samuelson rule. 
Hence, the welfare maximizing MCF is found by adding consumers’ marginal rate of substitution 
between private and public goods, 𝑀𝑅𝑆𝑧𝑐, and setting this equal to the marginal rate of transformation, 
𝑀𝑅𝑇𝑧𝑐, multiplied with the welfare maximizing cost-adjusting factor, 𝑀𝐶𝐹2. This factor is given by 
equation (2). 
 
(2) ∑ 𝑀𝑅𝑆𝑧𝑐 = 𝑀𝐶𝐹2𝑀𝑅𝑇𝑧𝑐.   
 
The MCF based on this modified Samuelson rule implements the welfare maximizing supply of public 
goods when profitable projects are effectuated. The first-best Samuelson rule holds if 𝑀𝐶𝐹2 equals 
one. The present study calculates MCF based on these two measures within optimal and sub-optimal 
tax systems.   
3. The model framework   
The model framework is designed to calculate MCF when a welfare maximizing government allocates 
public funds to public goods provision and social security transfers. A linear income tax distorts the 
labor/ leisure choice of working individuals. Different transfer systems are implemented to investigate 
implications for the MCF.       
3.2. The behavior of individuals  
There are two types of individuals in the economy with preferences for leisure, 𝑙𝑖, private 
consumption, 𝑐𝑖, and consumption of public goods, z. The utility function is identical for all 
individuals. 𝑛1individuals are working. The 𝑛2 non-working individuals receive social transfers. 
Utility functions are quasilinear for consumption above a given level, ?̂?. The quasilinear utility 
function excludes tax base effects due to income effects. The utility function of working 
individuals, 𝑢1, are given by   
 
(3) 𝑢1 =  𝑐1 + 𝑔(𝑙1) + 𝑓(𝑧).  
 
Both 𝑓(𝑧) and 𝑔(𝑙1) are increasing and strictly concave. Consumption is given by transfers, 𝑎, and the 
after-tax wage income  
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(4) 𝑐1 = (1 − 𝑡)𝑤ℎ1 + 𝑎,  
 
Where 𝑤 equals a fixed wage rate, ℎ1, equals hours of work, and 𝑡 equals the tax rate. The 
consumption of a working individual exceeds the consumption level ?̂?. The private consumer good is 
the numeraire with a price equal to one. The time constraint is given by 
 
(5) ℎ1 = 𝑇 − 𝑙1. 
 
Working individuals maximize utility, given by equation (3), conditional on their budget, equation (4), 
and their time constraint, equation (5). First order conditions for this optimization problem imply that  
 
(6) 𝜆 =1. 
 
The marginal utility of income, 𝜆 , equals one for all levels of consumption above ?̂?. First 





= (1 − 𝑡)𝑤.          
 
The marginal rate of substitution between leisure and private consumption equals the after- 
tax wage rate. The quasi linear utility function and the fixed wage rate implies that leisure is 
given by the tax rate, t.  
 
(8) 𝑙1 = 𝑙1(𝑡)          
𝜕𝑙1
𝜕𝑡
≥ 0  
 
This illustrates the distortion of the labor income tax. A later section shows that the welfare cost of 
raising tax revenue by increasing the labor income tax exceeds the resource cost with such 
preferences. The indirect utility of the working individual equals  
 
(9) 𝑣1 = (1 − 𝑡)𝑤(𝑇 − 𝑙1(𝑡)) + 𝑎 + 𝑔(𝑙1(𝑡)) + 𝑓(𝑧). 
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The utility of the non-working individual is given by 
 
(10) 𝑢2 =  𝑆(𝑐2) + 𝑔(𝑙2) + 𝑓(𝑧), where S’ > 1 and S’’ < 0 when 𝑐2 < ?̂?.     
 
The consumption of the non-working individual equals transfers, 𝑏. These transfers can be lower than 
?̂?. Hence, the indirect utility of the non-working individual is given by 
 
(11) 𝑣2 =  𝑆(𝑏) + 𝑔(𝑇) + 𝑓(𝑧). 
 
The utility derived from public goods provision is equalized between individuals. This 
assumption is implemented to illuminate the case with public goods without a specific 
distributional profile. The study also assumes that productivity and tax revenue is unaffected 
by the provision of public goods. These assumptions are crucial for results, see e.g. Sandmo 
(1998) and Kaplow (1996). 
3.1. The government  
The government maximizes an individualistic welfare function given the budget constraint of the 
government. Indirect utility functions are given by equation (9) and (11). The maximization problem 
of the government differs between scenarios with different social transfer schemes, and between 
scenarios with optimal and sub-optimal income taxation. Different scenarios are presented below.  
3.2.1 Uniform transfers  
The case with uniform transfers is implemented by assuming 𝑎 = 𝑏. The maximization problem with 




  𝑛1(1 − 𝑡)𝑤(𝑇 − 𝑙1(𝑡)) + 𝑛1𝑏 + 𝑛1𝑔(𝑙1(𝑡)) + 𝑛1𝑓(𝑧) + 𝑛2𝑆(𝑏) + 𝑛2𝑔(𝑇) +
𝑛2𝑓(𝑧) 
 
Given the budget constraint  
 
(13) 𝑛1𝑡𝑤(𝑇 − 𝑙1(𝑡)) = 𝑞𝑧 + 𝑛1𝑏 + 𝑛2𝑏. 
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The price of public goods measured in units of the consumer good is denoted 𝑞. The Lagrangian is 
given by 
 
(14) 𝐿 = 𝑛1(1 − 𝑡)𝑤(𝑇 − 𝑙1(𝑡)) + 𝑛1𝑏 + 𝑛1𝑔(𝑙1(𝑡)) + 𝑛1𝑓(𝑧) + 𝑛2𝑆(𝑏) + 𝑛2𝑔(𝑇) +
𝑛2𝑓(𝑧) + 𝜇[𝑛1𝑡𝑤(𝑇 − 𝑙1(𝑡)) − 𝑞𝑧 − 𝑛1𝑏 − 𝑛2𝑏]. 
 
The shadow value of public funds is denoted 𝜇. The restrictions on 𝑔(𝑙1), 𝑙1(𝑡), 𝑓(𝑧) and  𝑆(𝑏) imply 
that the Lagrangian is concave, see appendix A. The first order conditions and calculations of MCF are 
presented in appendix B. Key equations to calculate MCF is presented below.  
 
The MCF was defined as the shadow value of public funds divided by the average marginal utility of 
income, see equation (1). The shadow value of public funds, 𝜇 , which is the numerator on the right-














where the after-tax wage rate equals 𝑤𝑎 = (1 − 𝑡)𝑤. It follows directly from the first order conditions 
that the shadow value of public funds, 𝜇, equals the welfare cost of raising tax revenue. The shadow 
value of public funds equals 1.11 and 1.25 when the tax rate equals 0.5 and the labor supply elasticity 
equals 0.1 and 0.2, respectively. The average marginal utility of income, which is the denominator on 









Equation (1) and (16) implies that 
 




















Equation (16) and (18) implies that ?̄? = 𝜇. Hence 𝑀𝐶𝐹1 equals one. This confirms the result in Jacobs 
(2018). The opportunity cost of public goods funds is crucial for this result. The uniform-transfers-to-
all assumption imply that the value of money in the public sector equals the average marginal utility of 
money in the private sector. Hence, 𝑀𝐶𝐹1 equals one.   
 
The first order conditions also imply that the welfare cost of raising tax revenue, 𝜇, equals the welfare 







=  𝜇.  
 
Hence, the welfare gain of public goods provision exceeds the resource cost by a factor which equals 
the welfare cost of raising tax revenue. The 𝑀𝐶𝐹1, which is designed to implement this solution, 
however deviates from this factor because it is transformed into units of private consumer goods. This 
insight illuminates on the difference between the traditional approach in Browning (1976), and the 
optimal policy approach in e.g. Sandmo (1998).  
3.2.2 Uniform transfers and sub-optimal income taxation  
The maximization problem with sub-optimal income taxation is found by excluding the first order 
condition w.r.t. the income tax rate, 𝑡. Hence, equation (15) is excluded. Equation (15) is however 
redundant in calculations of 𝑀𝐶𝐹1. Hence, 𝑀𝐶𝐹1 equals one with both optimal and sub-optimal 
income taxation when uniform transfers are optimized. The economic intuition is that 𝑀𝐶𝐹1 is 
determined by the opportunity cost of public funds. The uniform-transfers-to-all assumption imply that 
the value of money in the public sector equals the average marginal utility of money in the private 
sector. 
 










= 𝑀𝐶𝐹2𝑞.  
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according to appendix C. This condition is identical in all scenarios. A comparison of equation (17) 
and (21) shows that the 𝑀𝐶𝐹2 is larger than 𝑀𝐶𝐹1 defined in equation (1) when 
𝜕𝑆
𝜕𝑐2
⁄  is larger than 










> 1if 𝜇 > 1.  
 
Equation (22) shows that 𝑀𝐶𝐹2 exceeds one when the shadow price of public funds, 𝜇, exceeds one. 
Equation (15) implies that 𝜇 is larger than one if 𝑡 is larger than zero. Finally, 𝑡 is larger than zero 
within an optimized solution because the marginal welfare gain of public goods provision and 
transfers exceeds one at low levels, and because tax revenue finances such public spending according 
to the government budget constraint. Hence, 𝑀𝐶𝐹2 exceeds one when uniform transfers are offered to 
all individuals. A MCF larger than one is required to implement the welfare maximizing supply of 
public goods. A downscaling of benefits within cost-benefit tests is required to implement the optimal 
supply of distribution neutral public goods if the MCF is set equal to one. An alternative interpretation 
is that the 𝑀𝐶𝐹2 exceeds 𝑀𝐶𝐹1 when non-workers are willing to sacrifice fewer private consumer 
goods for one public good compared to workers, i.e. 𝑀𝑅𝑆𝑧𝑐 for non-workers is lower than for workers. 
The 𝑀𝑅𝑆𝑧𝑐 between private and public goods is lower for non-working individuals as their marginal 
utility of private goods is higher. This theoretical outcome is consistent with the result in Boadway and 
Keen (1993).   
  
The solution for 𝑀𝐶𝐹2 within optimized income tax systems differ from the solution within sub-
optimal tax systems as the shadow value of public funds, 𝜇 , differ between these solutions. A sub-
optimal income tax rate generates an amount of tax revenue, which alters the shadow value of public 
funds, 𝜇. The proof acknowledges that the first order conditions implies a positive connection between 
𝑧 and 𝑏. This positive connection and the budget constraint imply that a reduction in the tax rate 
entails a reduction in both transfers and public goods provision. The first order conditions imply that a 
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reduction of transfers (or public goods provision) leads to an increase in the shadow value of public 
spending, 𝜇. It follows from equation (22) that an increase in the shadow value of public funds 
generates an increase in 𝑀𝐶𝐹2. Hence, an income tax rate below optimum requires a higher 𝑀𝐶𝐹2 
compared to an optimized solution. The magnitude of the change in 𝜇, and hence in 𝑀𝐶𝐹2, is 
determined by 𝑛1, 𝑛2and the shape of both 𝑆(𝑐2) and 𝑓(𝑧).         
3.2.3 Categorical transfers  
The case with categorical transfers, i.e. group specific transfers, is analyzed by assuming that workers 
and non-workers belong to different observable groups. Hence, the government chooses transfers to 
workers, 𝑎, transfers to non-workers, 𝑏, the supply of public goods, as well as the income tax rate. 
Note that this scenario also represents a scenario with individualized lump-sum transfers as individuals 




 𝑛1(1 − 𝑡)𝑤(𝑇 − 𝑙1(𝑡)) + 𝑛1𝑎 + 𝑛1𝑔(𝑙1(𝑡)) + 𝑛1𝑓(𝑧) + 𝑛2𝑆(𝑏) + 𝑛2𝑔(𝑇) +
𝑛2𝑓(𝑧) 
 
Given the budget constraint 
 
(24) 𝑛1𝑡𝑤(𝑇 − 𝑙1(𝑡)) = 𝑞𝑧 + 𝑛1𝑎 + 𝑛2𝑏. 
 
The first order conditions imply that 𝜕𝑆 𝜕𝑐2
⁄ = 𝜇 = 1, see appendix D. Transfers to non-workers 
therefore equals or exceeds ĉ . Hence, this solution, equation (1) and equation (16) imply that 𝑀𝐶𝐹1 
equals one. This solution and equation (21) also imply that 𝑀𝐶𝐹2 equals one. Categorical transfers are 
chosen to eliminate inequality in the average social marginal value of income between tagged groups. 
Hence, the result in Viard (2001) is confirmed. The income tax rate equals zero due to the condition in 
equation (15). This solution and the government budget constraint imply that 𝑛1𝑎 = −𝑞𝑧 − 𝑛2𝑏. 
Hence, public goods provision and transfers to non-workers are finances by positive lump-sum taxes 
on workers. 
 
Positive lump-sum taxes imposed by Margaret Thatcher in 1990 lead to social turmoil and riots. One 
may argue that positive lump-sum taxes is excluded from tax system to prevent potential costs of such 
turmoil. Hence, exclusion of such lump-sum taxes might be part of an optimal tax system. Many 
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countries have on the other hand implemented income tax systems with tax credits offered to low 
income earners. A reduction in such tax credits resembles a lump-sum tax on all workers if the tax 
credit is offered to all workers. Medium- and high-income earners are however excluded from the tax 
credit in countries where the tax credit is phased out as income exceeds some threshold. The earned 
income tax credit in the US is an example. Hence, adjustments in such tax credits do not resemble a 
lump-sum tax on all workers.   
 
The solution with a positive lump-sum tax on workers also imply that the average marginal utility of 
private consumption is equalized among workers and non-workers. The empirical relevance of this 
outcome is questionable because consumption levels differ substantially between workers and non-
workers in most countries. Hence, the solution with positive lump-sum taxes face substantial 
objections. The next section resolves these objections by considering tax systems where positive lump-
sum taxes are excluded.  
3.2.4 Non-negative categorical transfers  
A scenario which excludes positive lump-sum taxes is analyzed by assuming zero transfers to workers. 
Note that this assumption excludes the Kaplow (1996) argument as the government is no longer able 




 𝑛1(1 − 𝑡)𝑤(𝑇 − 𝑙1(𝑡)) + 𝑛1𝑔(𝑙1(𝑡)) + 𝑛1𝑓(𝑧) + 𝑛2𝑆(𝑏) + 𝑛2𝑔(𝑇) + 𝑛2𝑓(𝑧), 
 
given the budget constraint 
 
(26) 𝑛1𝑡𝑤(𝑇 − 𝑙1(𝑡)) = 𝑞𝑧 + 𝑛2𝑏. 
 
The first order condition w.r.t. transfers implies that the value of public funds equals the marginal 
utility of income for non-workers, 𝜕𝑆 𝜕𝑐2
⁄ = 𝜇. The first order condition w.r.t. the supply of public 
goods and 𝜕𝑆 𝜕𝑐2










= 𝜇.   
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Equation (27) shows that the marginal welfare cost of raising tax revenue, 𝜇, equals the marginal 
welfare gain of redistributing tax revenue, 𝜕𝑆 𝜕𝑐2
⁄ . The marginal welfare cost of raising tax revenue 
also equals the marginal welfare gain of investing money in public goods provision. This marginal 
welfare gain exceeds the cost of investing in public goods provision by a factor equal to the cost of 
collecting tax revenue, 𝜇.    
 
The marginal welfare gain of public goods provision is divided with the average marginal utility of 







= 𝑀𝐶𝐹1𝑞.  
 
The left-hand side of equation (28) is a measure of the governments’ willingness to pay for public 
goods measured in units of the private goods. This equals the marginal rate of transformation between 
public and private goods, 𝑞, multiplied with 𝑀𝐶𝐹1 defined as the governments’ marginal rate of 








> 1if 𝜇 > 1.    
 
The numerator in the definition of 𝑀𝐶𝐹1, 𝜇, equals the welfare gain of transferring public funds to 
non-working, 𝜕𝑆 𝜕𝑐2
⁄ . This gain exceeds the average marginal utility of income. Hence, 𝑀𝐶𝐹1 
exceeds one as the value of public funds, 𝜇, exceeds the average marginal utility of income, ?̄?. This 
outcome is consistent with the result in Slack (2015), which shows that the average social marginal 
value of income for the poor group is higher than average within solutions where positive lump-sum 
taxes are excluded and the size of the poor group is sufficiently large. 𝑀𝐶𝐹1 exceeds one in this 
scenario so that public goods provision matches the welfare gain of transfers to non-workers. 𝑀𝐶𝐹1 
exceeds one even though the marginal welfare cost of collecting tax revenue equals the marginal 
welfare gain of transfers. Hence, this finding violates the claim in Jacobs (2018) that the MCF equals 




Equation (21) and 𝜕𝑆 𝜕𝑐2







𝑀𝐶𝐹2 also exceeds one because 𝜇 is given by the condition in equation (15), and public spending is 
financed by distorting labor income taxation.  
 
The maximization problem with sub-optimal income taxation is found by following the method 
described in Section 3.2.1. The solution for 𝑀𝐶𝐹2 and 𝑀𝐶𝐹1 within optimized income tax systems, 
however, differ from the solution within sub-optimal tax systems. A sub-optimal income tax rate 
generates a scarce amount of tax revenue which alters the shadow value of public funds, 𝜇. The proof 
acknowledges that the first order conditions implies a positive connection between 𝑧 and 𝑏. This 
positive connection and the budget constraint imply that a reduction in the tax rate leads to a reduction 
in both transfers and public goods provision. The first order conditions imply that a reduction of 
transfers, or public goods provision, leads to an increase in the shadow value of public spending, 𝜇. It 
follows from equation (30) that an increase in the shadow value of public funds generates an increase 
in 𝑀𝐶𝐹2. It follows from equation (29) that an increase in the shadow value of public funds generates 
an increase in 𝑀𝐶𝐹1. Hence, an income tax rate below optimum requires a higher 𝑀𝐶𝐹2 and 𝑀𝐶𝐹1 
compared to an optimized solution in this case. The magnitude of the change in 𝜇, and hence in 𝑀𝐶𝐹2 
and 𝑀𝐶𝐹1, is determined by 𝑛1, 𝑛2and the shape of both 𝑆(𝑐2) and 𝑓(𝑧). 
3.2.5 A tax on consumption  
This section investigates how the MCF is affected when the tax on labor earnings is replaced with a 
proportional tax on consumption. The section calculates MCF when the tax on labor earnings is 
replaced with a proportional tax on consumption, 𝑡𝑐. The behavior of individuals described in sections 
3.1 is repeated with the tax on consumption implemented into budget constraints. Indirect utility 
functions are obtained by following the same approach as in section 3.1. The government 







+ 𝑛1𝑔(𝑙(𝑡𝑐)) +  𝑛1𝑓(𝑧) + 𝑛2𝑆 (
𝑏
1+𝑡𝑐
) + 𝑛2𝑔(𝑇) + 𝑛2𝑓(𝑧) 
 








= 𝑞𝑧 + 𝑛2𝑏 
 
Note that tax payments on government investments in public goods provision is paid to the 
government. Hence, such tax payments cancel out of the government budget constraint. First order 
conditions w.r.t. public goods provision and transfers are identical to corresponding conditions in the 
case with labor income taxation. Hence, formulas for both 𝑀𝐶𝐹2 and 𝑀𝐶𝐹1 are identical to formulas 
in section 3.2.4. The welfare maximizing solution therefore satisfies the modified Samuelson 
condition, equation (20), where 𝑀𝐶𝐹2 is given by equation (30).  
 
The accumulated willingness to pay for an additional public good measured in units of consumer 
goods is identical with the case where the tax was levied on labor income, section 3.2.4. The tax on the 
consumer good is however no longer normalized to zero. The tax on labor income is normalized to 
zero. The accumulated willingness to pay for an additional public good measured in units of (labor) 
income therefore equals the accumulated 𝑀𝑅𝑆𝑧𝑐 multiplied with the price of the consumer good, 
(1 + 𝑡𝑐). The cost of an additional public good measured in units of the consumer good equals 𝑞. The 
cost measured in units of labor income also equals 𝑞 if investments in public goods are exempt from 
the tax on consumption. The cost however equals 𝑞(1 + 𝑡𝑐) if investments in public goods are not 
exempt from the tax on consumer goods.  
 
An applied cost-benefit test evaluates the willingness to pay for public goods against the cost of 
producing public goods measured in money, which in this scenario is transformed to units of income. 
It is therefore crucial to separate between cases where the consumer tax is levied on investments in 
public goods provision, and cases where such investments are exempt from the tax. Multiplying the 
modified Samuelson rule in equation (20) with (1 + 𝑡𝑐) transforms the condition so that the left-hand 
side equals the accumulated willingness to pay for an additional public good measured in units of 
income. The right-hand side equals 𝑀𝐶𝐹2(1 + 𝑡𝑐)𝑞. Hence, the right-hand side equals the cost of an 
additional public good multiplied with 𝑀𝐶𝐹2 in scenarios where the consumer tax is also levied on 
public goods investments. The MCF is however scaled up with (1 + 𝑡𝑐) in scenarios where public 
goods investments are exempt from the tax on the consumer good.   
3.2.6 Income effects on the supply of labor 
The quasilinear utility function employed in the analyzes above excludes income effects on the supply 
of labor. This section explores how results are affected when this utility function is replaced with a 
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Stone-Geary utility function, which includes income effects on the supply of labor. The utility function 
equals 
 
(33) 𝑢𝑖 = (𝑐𝑖 + ?̄?)
𝛼𝑙𝑖
1−𝛼 + 𝑓(𝑧) for 𝑖 = 1,2. 
 
?̄? is a parameter. Other assumptions within the non-negative categorical transfer scenario are 
unchanged. The government maximization problem is found by following the approach in section 
















𝛼𝑇1−𝛼 + 𝑓(𝑧)] 
 
Given the budget constraint 
 
(35) 𝑛1𝑡𝑤 (𝛼𝑇 −
(1−𝛼)𝑐̄
(1−𝑡)𝑤
) = 𝑞𝑧 + 𝑛2𝑏. 
 
Appendix E shows that 𝑀𝐶𝐹1 equals   
 








Implementing equation (15) into equation (29) and comparing this with equation (36) shows that 
formulas for 𝑀𝐶𝐹1 are identical in scenarios with Stone-Geary and scenarios with quasilinear 
preferences.  Appendix E shows that 𝑀𝐶𝐹2 equals 
 









.   
 
Implementing equation (15) into equation (30) and comparing this with equation (37) shows that 
formulas for 𝑀𝐶𝐹2 are identical in scenarios with Stone-Geary and scenarios with quasilinear 
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preferences. The explanation is that social transfers are given to non-workers only within these 
scenarios. Such transfers do not influence the supply of labor in these scenarios. Hence, the MCF, 
which is determined by the welfare gain of transfers, is not altered when quasilinear preferences are 
replaced with Stone-Geary preferences.     
4. Numerical illustrations     
This section calculates MCF based on parameter values and labor force data from the US and Norway. 
The aim is to illuminate how MCF is affected by changes in parameters and assumptions. Parameters 
and functional forms are calibrated so that the model fit with aggregate labor force data and relevant 
labor supply responses within each scenario. This approach generates MCF estimates for each scenario 
that are consistent with data. The calibration method may however lead to inconsistencies between 
scenarios as changes in assumptions may lead to changes in optimal policy and labor force outcome 
which is excluded by the calibration method. Scenarios are therefore not directly comparable.    
4.1 Uniform transfers  
The case with uniform transfers to all do not resemble real world social transfer systems. Hence, 
adjustments compared to real world tax and transfer systems are required to construct this scenario. 
The current total US tax wedge on labor earnings includes an average tax on labor earnings of 
approximately 30 percent in 2018 according to OECD data, a sales tax ranging from 0 to 10 percent in 
different states, as well as a corporate income tax, real estate taxes, and other indirect taxes. The tax 
revenue required to finance uniform transfers to all individuals is however likely to exceed the current 
tax revenue by a substantial margin as current transfers are given to specific groups only. It is difficult 
to pinpoint the optimal tax rate. Piketty and Saez (2012) however find an optimal linear tax of 
approximately 60 percent in a scenario with uniform transfers, a utilitarian welfare function and 
elasticities based on empirical studies. The scenario is therefore calibrated to a 60 percent tax rate to 
finance uniform transfers to all.     
 
The number of employed individuals, full time or part time, in the US in 2018 amounts to 155.6 
million according to US Bureau of Labor Statistics. Some individuals also work less than a part time 
job. The scenario is therefore calibrated to a labor force of 156.76 million workers. The US Bureau of 
Labor Statistics further report that 94.1 million over the age of 16 do not participate in the labor force. 
A substantial share of these individuals receives some type of social security transfer as their main 
source of income. It is however difficult to pinpoint the exact number of individuals which receives 
some type of transfer from the government. The main scenario assumes that 70 million individuals 
21 
receive some type of social transfer. A scenario of 35 million is also presented to uncover whether this 
number is crucial for calculations of MCF.  
 
The average estimate of the Hicksian labor supply elasticity approximately equals 0.3 for males but is 
larger for women mainly due to entry-exit according to the survey in Keane (2011). Marshallian 
elasticities are more modest, and elasticities are declining over time, see Blau and Kahn (2007). Two 
scenarios are analyzed where the aggregate elasticity equals 0.1 and 0.2. Table 1 present data and 
results for the USA economy.  
 
Table 1. Labor force data and MCF for the USA  





𝜇 𝑀𝐶𝐹1 𝑀𝐶𝐹2   
 
Uniform transfers  156.76 70 0.1 0.6 1.57 1.176 1 1.04 
Uniform transfers   156.76 70 0.2 0.6 2.388 1.428 1 1.17 
Uniform transfers   156.76 35 0.2 0.6 3.348 1.428 1 1.25 
Uniform transfers, sub-optimal   156.76 70 0.2 0.5 2.850 1.571 1 1.26 
Non-negative categorical trans.   156.76 70 0.1 0.4 1.071 1.071 1.05 1.05 
Non-negative categorical trans.    156.76 70 0.2 0.4 1.154 1.154 1.10 1.11 
Non-negative trans. sub-opt    156.76 70 0.2 0.3 1.269 1.269 1.17 1.19 
 
Uniform transfers within optimized solutions implies that the value of money in the public sector, 𝜇, 
equals the average marginal utility of money in the private sector, ?̄?. This condition also holds when 
the income tax rate is sub-optimal. Hence, the 𝑀𝐶𝐹1 equals one with optimal and sub-optimal income 
taxation.  
 
The 𝑀𝐶𝐹2 exceeds one when uniform transfers are offered to all individuals. Table 1 shows that 
𝑀𝐶𝐹2 in the US economy equals 1.04 and 1.17-1.25 when tax- and transfers are optimized, and the 
labor supply elasticity equals 0.1 and 0.2, respectively. The gain of transfers, ?̄?, equals the cost of 
raising tax revenue, 𝜇. This cost is substantial due to the 60 percent tax rate. The gain equals the 
average marginal utility of income, where the stock of workers has a marginal utility of income of one, 
and the smaller stock of non-workers has a marginal utility of income of  𝜕𝑆 𝜕𝑐2
⁄ . Hence, the marginal 
utility of income for non-workers must be substantial to satisfy the optimal tax condition, see table 1. 




A tax rate below the optimal level leads to a reduction in tax revenue which lowers both transfers and 
public goods provision. Reduced transfers and public goods provision increase the marginal welfare 
gain of both transfers and public goods provision. Hence, the shadow value of public funds increases. 
The magnitude of the change in 𝜇, and hence in 𝑀𝐶𝐹2, is determined by 𝑛1, 𝑛2and the shape of both 
𝑆(𝑐2) and 𝑓(𝑧). Empirical evidence on the shape of these functions is unavailable. The illustration 
assumes that a 10-percentage point reduction in the tax rate generates a 10 percent increase in the 
value of public funds. Table 1 show that 𝑀𝐶𝐹2 approximately equals 1.26 when the tax rate is 10 
percentage points below optimum, and the labor supply elasticity equals 0.2.   
4.2 Non-negative categorical transfers  
Non-negative categorical transfers are implemented by assuming zero transfers to workers and 
categorical transfers to non-workers. It is assumed that the total optimal tax rate on labor earnings 
equals 40 percent in the US. Each scenario is calibrated to current labor force data presented above. 
The 𝑀𝐶𝐹1 exceeds one within optimized systems as the numerator in the definition of 𝑀𝐶𝐹1, 𝜇, 
exceeds the average marginal utility of income. Table 1 shows that 𝑀𝐶𝐹1 in the US economy equals 
1.05 and 1.10 when taxes- and transfers are optimized, given that labor supply elasticities equal 0.1 
and 0.2, respectively. The 𝑀𝐶𝐹1 is even larger when the income tax rate is below optimum. An 
income tax rate below optimum leads to an increase in the shadow value of public fund. This increases 
the numerator in 𝑀𝐶𝐹1 more than the denominator. Table 1 shows that 𝑀𝐶𝐹1 in the US economy 
equals 1.17 when the tax rate is sub-optimal, and the labor supply elasticity equals 0.2.         
 
The 𝑀𝐶𝐹2 also exceeds one within optimized systems in this case. Table 1 shows that 𝑀𝐶𝐹2 in the US 
economy approximately equals 1.05 and 1.11 when taxes- and transfers are optimized, for labor 
supply elasticities equal to 0.1 and 0.2, respectively. The formula for 𝑀𝐶𝐹2 in equation (21) resembles 
the formula for 𝑀𝐶𝐹1 in equation (17). Hence 𝑀𝐶𝐹2 exceeds one for the same reasons as for 𝑀𝐶𝐹1. 
Bjertnæs (2018) shows that these results hold with extensive margin labor choices. Table 1 also shows 
that 𝑀𝐶𝐹2 approximately equals 1.19 when the tax rate is 10 percentage points below optimum, and 
the labor supply elasticity equals 0.2. Replacing the income tax with a tax on consumer goods do not 
affect calculations of MCF when the consumer tax is also levied on public goods investments.  
 
The case of Norway is illustrated by implementing data from 2017 and 2018. The total number of 
working individuals, 𝑛1, amounts to 2.682 million. The Norwegian government reports that 687000 
individuals between the age 18 to 66 received some type of social security transfer in 2017. The 
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number of individuals receiving public pensions in 2018 was 890000 individuals. Some of these are 
younger than 66 years old. Hence, approximately 1.5 million individuals received social security 
transfers in Norway.  
 
The current Norwegian tax wedge on labor earnings is set equal to 50 percent. This tax wedge includes 
an average tax on labor earnings of approximately 36 percent in 2018 according to OECD data. The 
VAT on most consumer goods in Norway equals 25 percent. There is also a corporate income tax, and 
indirect taxes. Table 2 present data and results for Norway.    
 
Table 2. Labor force data and MCF for Norway   





𝜇 𝑀𝐶𝐹1 𝑀𝐶𝐹2 
 
Uniform transfers  2.682 1.5 0.1 0.6 1.491 1.176 1 1.04 
Uniform transfers   2.682 1.5 0.2 0.6 2.193 1.428 1 1.15 
Uniform transfers, sub-optimal    2.682 1.5 0.2 0.5 2.592 1.571 1 1.22 
Non-negative categorical trans.   2.682 1.5 0.1 0.5 1.111 1.111 1.07 1.07 
Non-negative categorical trans.    2.682 1.5 0.2 0.5 1.25 1.25 1.15 1.16 
Non-negative cat. trans, sub-opt.   2.682 1.5 0.2 0.4 1.375 1.375 1.21 1.24 
 
Scenarios with optimized income tax rate and uniform transfers to all individuals are calibrated to a 60 
percent tax rate on labor earnings. Calculations show that the MCF for the Norwegian economy are 
almost identical with calculations of MCF for the US economy in this case. Calculations based on 
scenarios with non-negative categorical transfers shows that MCF for the Norwegian economy are 
slightly above calculations for the US economy. The main reason is the higher optimal tax on wage 
earnings.  
5. Conclusion   
Several studies show cases where the Samuelson rule holds, or where the MCF, defined as the ratio 
between the marginal value of money in the public and the private sector, equals one, see e.g. Hylland 
and Zeckhauser (1979), Boadway and Keen (1993), Kaplow (1996), Sandmo (1998), Christiansen 
(1981), Christiansen (2007) and Jacobs (2018). Such definitions of MCF require a modification of the 
Samuelson rule, however, where the willingness to pay for public goods is adjusted with distributional 
characteristics of public goods, see Sandmo (1998) and Jacobs (2018). Distributional characteristics of 
public goods are however excluded from both applied cost-benefit tests and the original Samuelson 
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rule. The present study contributes by calculating MCF designed for applied cost-benefit tests, i.e. 
where distributional characteristics of public goods are excluded from benefits within cost-benefit 
tests. The study shows that the MCF approximately equals 1.04 and 1.17-1.25 within optimized 
solutions with uniform transfers and identical additive preferences for public goods when the 
uncompensated labor supply elasticity equals 0.1 and 0.2, respectively. Similar results are found in 
cases with categorical transfers to poor groups. Hence, the optimal supply of public goods is below the 
supply obtained by the Samuelson rule. The MCF is designed so that the welfare gain of public goods 
provision equals the welfare gains of social security transfers. Hence, income taxation below optimum 
requires an even higher MCF as the opportunity cost of public funds is increased.  
 
The cost of raising tax revenue by distorting taxes is incorporated into cost-benefit analyses of public 
projects by multiplying costs with a factor, the MCF. The present study however concludes that the 
MCF is determined by the opportunity cost of public funds. The opportunity cost of public funds is 
determined by the marginal welfare gain of social security transfers. The MCF exceeds one in several 
scenarios to satisfy this condition. Future research could illuminate on implications for MCF and 
public goods provision of more realistic social security transfer schemes. Such schemes include social 
security transfers combined with employment programs, social security fraud and mobility between 
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A. The second order condition: 
The second order condition is satisfied if the Lagrangian is concave. The Lagrangian consists of 
separable one variable functions. Hence, the condition is satisfied if the second order derivatives with 
respect to each variable are negative.    



















= (1 − 𝜇)𝑛1𝑤
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< 0 if 1 ,   
















B. The first order conditions: 
The Envelope Theorem is employed to calculate the impact of a marginal change in the tax rate.  



























+𝜇 [𝑛1𝑤(𝑇 − 𝑙1(𝑡)) − 𝑛1
𝜕𝑙1
𝜕𝑡




= 𝑛1 + 𝑛2
𝜕𝑆
𝜕𝑐2
− (𝑛1 + 𝑛2)𝜇 = 0  
The budget constraint implies that     
(B 4) 𝑛1𝑡𝑤(𝑇 − 𝑙1(𝑡)) = 𝑞𝑧 + 𝑛1𝑏 + 𝑛2𝑏 
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Equation (B 2) gives 













and 0t .   
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The numerical illustration, however, require some additional calculations. First, the definition of 
leisure,  
(B 8) 11 hTl −= , 










 11  
Second, the definition of the after-tax wage rate,  
(B 10) 𝑤𝑎 = (1 − 𝑡)𝑤, 























Inserting (B10) and (B 13) into equation (B 6) gives 












C. MCF based on the modified Samuelson rule    
The point of departure is the first order equation (B 5) 






























− 1) = 𝜇𝑞 
Hence,  






















 on the right-hand side with equation (B 5) gives  
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− 1)] 𝑞 
Hence, 𝑀𝐶𝐹2 is given by the expression  














Inserting equation (B 7) into equation (C 5) gives  









> 1if 1 .  
 
D. First order conditions with categorical transfers  
Equation (B 3) is replaced with the following conditions  













− 𝑛2𝜇 = 0  
 
E. Stone-Geary utility  
The lagrangian is 












𝛼𝑇1−𝛼 + 𝑓(𝑧)] + 𝜇(𝑛1𝑡𝑤 (𝛼𝑇 −
(1−𝛼)𝑐̄
(1−𝑡)𝑤
) − 𝑞𝑧 − 𝑛2𝑏) 




























































] = 0 








The budget constraint implies that     
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(E 5) 𝑛1𝑡𝑤 (𝛼𝑇 −
(1−𝛼)𝑐̄
(1−𝑡)𝑤
) = 𝑞𝑧 + 𝑛2𝑏  
The definition of 𝑀𝐶𝐹1 and implies that     










Implementing the first order condition for working individuals’ choices of labor supply into equation 
(E 3) implies that 















Implementing (E 7) and equation (E 4) and the definition of the labor supply elasticity from appendix 
B into equation (E 6) gives 



















Implementing equation (E 2), equation (E 7), equation (E 4) and the definition of the labor supply 
elasticity from appendix B into equation (E 9) gives 
(E 10) 𝑀𝐶𝐹2  =  
𝑛1+𝑛2(1−
𝑡
1−𝑡
𝐸𝑙𝑤𝑎ℎ1)
(𝑛1+𝑛2)(1−
𝑡
1−𝑡
𝐸𝑙𝑤𝑎ℎ1)
  
 
